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Abstract: 
Human capital accumulation has long been recognized as critical to economic growth and 
development.  In recent years focus on the intra-household  distribution of human capital has 
intensified both theoretically and empirically.  However, connecting the theoretical and empirical 
literature has been impeded by the difficulty in measuring human intra-household capital levels – 
particularly for children in the midst of the accumulation process.  In this paper we approach this issue 
using the intra-household dispersion of the rate of progress through the education system as a proxy 
for the final dispersion of intra-household human capital.  Focusing on intra-household dispersion 
avoids many of the problematic issues associated with measures of human capital levels.  We identify 
a previously unreported relationship between the intra-household dispersion of this observable human 
capital (OHK) and household income.  We explore various explanations and implications of this 
pattern, and argue that this relationship is consistent with the inefficient distribution of intra-
household human capital suggested by recent theoretical work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Synthesis of the seminal works of Schultz (1971) on human capital and Becker 
(1960) on the household has generated a vast literature on the household as a locus of 
human capital investment decisions.  However, the distribution of human capital across 
children within the household has received relatively less attention.  This distribution 
may reflect more than the innate heterogeneity of children due to the presence of 
borrowing constraints in human capital markets (for discussion see Keane and Wolpin 
2001), among other things.  Distortions in the distribution of intra-household human 
capital are therefore more likely to appear in poor households and in low income 
countries (LICs).     
The conceptual and empirical challenges that accompany analysis of the 
distribution of children’s human capital within the household are considerable.  In 
particular, direct measures of human capital levels for children in the midst of the 
accumulation process are scarce.  However, our analysis avoids many of the problematic 
issues associated with measuring child human capital levels since it addresses the intra-
household dispersion of observable human capital (OHK).  While we believe there are a 
number of reasonable variables to capture this dispersion in both high and low income 
countries we focus in this paper on a large low (or middle) income country (Brazil) as the 
greater magnitude of intra-household specialization is useful for demonstration purposes.  
In particular, our OHK proxy– the rate of progress through the education system – 
emerges early in life in many lower income countries.   
Our analysis reveals a previously unreported pattern of intra-household human 
capital dispersion across the income distribution.  This relationship is strongly significant 
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and robust to the measure of dispersion after controlling for household demographic 
structure and other factors.  Our findings are consistent with recent theoretical work that 
suggests distortions in the pattern of intra-household child specialization across education 
and labor market activities in poor LIC households.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section II lays out the 
conceptual and empirical issues and also provides a literature review.  Section III 
describes the data and the empirical methodology.  Section IV presents the empirical 
results.  Section V summarizes, concludes, and outlines further directions for research.  
 
II. Conceptual Issues and Literature Review 
Overview 
Individual human capital levels are, in general, strongly affected by household 
level influences and decisions during childhood.1  In particular, parental decisions 
regarding the time allocation of their children, as well as direct investment in human 
capital are of critical importance (see Behrman et al. 1995).  This issue has received 
much attention in the LIC context, where poverty may cause some children to be selected 
by their parents as labor market specialists and others as human capital specialists at an 
early age.  Though specialization across children also occurs in poor households in high-
income-countries, its manifestation is typically not as stark or pervasive as in LICs. 
The allocation of child-time has been a principal focus of the vast child- labor 
literature (see Basu, 1999 and 2003 for surveys).  Baland and Robinson (2000) provide a 
model of the parent’s decision to allocate child-time between labor market and human 
capital accumulation but do not consider parents’ problem of allocation across children.   
                                                 
1 The general efficiency properties of intra-household allocation have been explored by Browning and 
Chiappori (1998). 
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Except in the case of a single-child household, the parent’s time allocation problem for 
children is thus considerably more complicated than suggested by the first generation of 
theoretical child-labor models.  In particular, parents with multiple children must jointly 
determine the time allocation of tasks across all children as well as the allocation of time 
for each child.  When children are heterogeneous it is natural to expect this parental 
allocation decision to involve specialization.  Cross-child specialization is addressed in a 
recent theoretical work by Horowitz and Wang (2004) who demonstrate that the pattern 
of specialization implied by comparative advantage does not typically hold for poor 
households facing imperfect human capital markets.  This implies a relationship between 
income and the intra-household dispersion of human capital across children since the 
human capital investment decisions of the poor are more likely to be affected by capital 
markets imperfections.   
 
Household Education Progress Dispersion as a Proxy for Human Capital Dispersion 
 The final dispersion of human capital across siblings within a family is only 
observable when the accumulation process is “complete.”  In practice the process of 
human capital accumulation continues throughout a lifetime, with “experience” replacing 
education as the engine of capital creation.  Therefore, the “completed” OHK profile of 
siblings could typically only be observed in reconstructed families, or in the atypical 
families that do not disperse. Though data that allows the reconstruction of households 
after dispersal could reveal siblings’ education dispersion, the question of when human 
capital accumulation is complete would remain.  However, if patterns of intra-household 
human capital dispersion appear early and are relatively stationary through time, the 
problematic issues associated with estimating final human capital levels for the children 
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of a household may be avoided.  In this paper we will present evidence that patterns of 
intra-household human capital dispersion do typically emerge early and that the 
demographically adjusted dispersion of intra-household educational progress is the best 
available proxy for the final dispersion of siblings’ human capital in many low-income 
countries.  The power of this proxy is typically far greater in low-income countries than 
in high- income countries because of the prevalence of delay due to grade repetition, late 
matriculation, and school withdrawal.  Our use of the intra-household dispersion of 
relative progress through the education system as a proxy for the final dispersion of 
siblings’ human capital is one of the principal innovations of this paper and we believe 
this technique may have wide-spread applicability.   
The use of progress through the education system, rather than ultimate 
achievement (were it available) as a proxy for human capital also addresses the potential 
problem of education as a consumption good. If education is a normal good, final 
achievement may be positively correlated with income.  However, even in this case there 
is little theoretical basis to expect any consumption effect to influence the rate of progress 
through the system.  That is, education as a consumption good would be manifest in 
either higher final achievement or higher quality of education, not as grade repetition.   
 
The Rate of Education Progress and Final Education Attainment  
There exists a well established (inverse) correlation between delayed educational 
progress and final academic achievement.  Indeed, this link is accepted as foundational in 
the education literature (for discussion and survey of this relationship in the U.S. see 
Meisels and Liaw 1993 and Byrnes and Yamamoto 1989).  Evidence of the inverse 
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correlation between the rate of education progress and final achievement also exists for 
low-income countries – see, for example, Bedi and Marshall (2002) and Barro and Lee 
(1999, 2001), and Lee and Barro (2001).   There is also direct evidence linking grade 
repetition to the innate distribution of human capital within the household. For example, 
Currie and Thomas (1995) find that within families, higher child IQ scores are powerfully 
correlated (inversely) with grade repetition. 2    This strengthens the case for our proxy 
since the intra-household distribution of innate ability is almost certainly strongly 
correlated with the final distribution of human capital within the household (after 
controlling for demographic structure, including gender and birth-order effects).   
As noted above, delayed educational progress can have numerous causes. In most 
environments the principal causes are grade repetition, late matriculation, and 
withdrawal.  Ideally, we would like to distinguish these causes of delay as their 
correlation with final educational attainment may be different.  However, most 
household- level survey data (including the data we employ) cannot assign delay to a 
specific cause. It is reasonable, therefore to consider the implications of aggregating the 
causes of delay generally.   
We first note a semantic point:  each child’s rate of progress should map to a 
unique delay and we use both terminologies (progress and delay), depending on context.  
“Delay,” in the generic sense, occurs when a student displays a level of education 
achievement below the “idealized” level for their age.3   Returning to the sources of 
delay, though their aggregation is not ideal, it has economic rationale.  Namely, in the 
                                                 
2 The precise test administered to children was the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT). 
3 By “idealized” we mean the grade attained for a child who begins matriculation at the normal age and has no grade 
repetitions or withdrawal.  It is possible, either through early matriculation or through “skipping” grades for a student to 
be ahead of “idealized” progress – that is, to exhibit a negative delay. 
  
6 
low-income countries, delay, regardless of its source, likely imposes similar opportunity 
costs for the child.  For example, sixteen year olds who have completed 6 years of 
education instead of the idealized 9, likely face similar opportunity costs in the decision 
to matriculate for a seventh year regardless of the source of the delay.  That is, the student 
whose three year delay is due to repetition and the student who matriculated late would 
likely both be viewed by the labor market as a sixteen year old with six completed years 
of education.  This is due, in part, to the fact that in many low-income countries the cause 
of the delay may not be easily verifiable by the labor market.   
 
Child Specialization and School Performance in LIC 
As noted, our data in this paper is from a LIC because there is strong prior 
evidence of child specialization in these settings.  Incentives for child specialization 
include increasing returns to education, education capital market imperfections, and 
innate heterogeneity of children.  Evidence of significant intra-household child 
specialization in either labor market or human capital activities can be found from 
Botswana (Chernichovsky’s 1985) to Brazil (Emerson and Souza 2002) to Pakistan 
(Burki and Fasih 1998). Ravallion and Wodon (2000) exploit a targeted school stipend in 
Bangladesh to test the extent to which child labor displaces schooling. Interestingly (and 
of relevance to our result), they find that much of the displacement effect is indirect.  
That is, labor may first displace complementary human capital activities such as 
homework, before school attendance directly.  Such subtle effects of specialization would 
be captured by our proxy -- though not by a simple measure of school attendance.  
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Further discussion and numerous other references to specialization in child labor-
education activities can be found in Grooaert and Patrinos (1999, eds.).   
 The child-specialization documented in the literature reviewed above can be 
manifest in diverse ways: from the extreme case where one child is chosen to matriculate 
and another to work, to the more subtle forms where some children are given more time 
for homework or reduced household chores. Indeed, specialization could even manifest in 
forms that are likely invisible in economic data such as the when some children simply 
receive more encouragement to succeed in school than others.  These types of parental 
attitude effects are well documented in the sociology literature (see for example Buchman 
2002).   However, regardless of its form, patterns of parental allocation of their children’s 
time should effect the dispersion of academic performance across children.  What is 
important for our motivation is that the effects of specialization are manifest in an 
observable academic performance variable at a fairly early age.  Delay is precisely such a 
variable.  
 
Education Policies 
Potential correlations between education policies, delay (repetition), school 
quality, and income could muddle the signal between income and the dispersion of 
observable human capital.  Fortunately, the effect of the principal channel of this 
correlation is to strengthen our results.  Specifically, since school quality is generally 
positively correlated with income, poor children have less incentive to stay in school, all 
else equal.  This level effect – that poor children have lower academic achievement than 
the rich – will tend to reduce the intra-household delay dispersion of the measure we 
adopt for poor children.  Since our principal finding is that children in poor households 
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have greater dispersion of delay, our effect must dominate the level-effect associated with 
lower achievement levels.  We therefore interpret our results as indicative of a lower 
bound of distortion.  The precise impact of the level-effect on our measure of dispersion 
will be developed in the following section.   
A second issue associated with education policies that vary with income concerns 
promotion standards.  In some settings higher delay rates may be indicative of higher 
school quality (rather than lower student capability).4  In Brazil it is likely that the reverse 
is true – at least at the lower end of the school quality distribution. 5  That is, in very poor 
schools low standards and resources result in (near) automatic promotion.  Again, 
however, our dispersion results can not be attributable to this factor since automatic 
promotion would reduce intra-household dispersion and we find increased dispersion in 
the poorest families.  Finally, one might question whether the intra-household dispersion 
of school quality varies systematically with income.  For example, within a given 
household some children may attend primary school and others secondary school.  If 
inter-school promotion standards varied systematically across the income distribution, the 
dispersion signal we identify could reflect inter-school promotion heterogeneity rather 
than household specialization.  We think this possibility is neither likely nor problematic 
in our case.  In addition to the likelihood that children in a given household attend 
                                                 
4  See Harbison and Hanushek 1992 and Psacharopoulos and Velez 1991. While this may seem to contradict the use of 
delay as an inverse measure of human capital recall that our focus is intra-household delay dispersion.  Since children 
in a given household typically attend schools with similar promotion standards, demographically adjusted repetition 
rates remain a negative signal of academic progress.   
 
5 It is also possible that very rich schools have high promotion rates due to high parental investment in all children.  
This would suggest a non-monotonic relationship between delay dispersion and income. Again, however, our 
estimation reveals a powerful and robust negative correlation between income and intra-household delay dispersion.   
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schools with similar promotion policies, at the lower end of the income distribution most 
children do not advance to secondary school.  Moreover, in controlling for the 
demographic structure and location variables of the household we are controlling to some 
degree for the fact that within a household, children may attend different schools. 
 
Measures of Progress/Delay and Measures of Dispersion 
One of the most natural measures of the rate of educational progress is the ratio of 
current educational attainment and the idealized level of attainment.   For example at a 
given time let educationih be the completed years of schooling for child i in a household 
h, ageih the age of child i in a household h, and let entry denote the expected age of initial 
school attendance in the particular environment.  Then the measure of education progress 
is: Pih = entryage
education
ih
ih
- , where the denominator represents the “idealized” education 
attainment.   With this measure Pih = 1 indicates idealized progress, Pih < 1 indicates 
some delay, and Pih > 1 indicates accelerated progress.  Thus, this measure indicates 
actual progress relative to idealized progress in percentage terms.  
As our ultimate concern is the intra-household dispersion of educational progress 
across children it is important to consider the dispersion properties of a measure of delay.  
Many measures of dispersion (e.g., Coefficient of variation, Theil, Gini) of the Pih above 
exhibit scale independence in that they are insensitive to proportional scaling of all 
children’s education level within a household.  As a simple example consider two 
demographically identical households – each with two fifteen year old children.  Suppose 
that in the first household the children have completed the first and second grades while 
in the second household they have completed the fourth and eighth grades.  A scale-
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independent inequality index would assign the same delay dispersion (for the Pih above) 
to both households.  However, one may prefer a measure which reflects the fact that 
absolute inequality is greater in the second household.  A generalized measure of delay 
that allows both scale independence and scale dependence in dispersion can be obtained 
by simply adding a constant to the measure above.  That is, now define the measure of 
progress as: 
 
(1)  0, ³-
+= K
entryage
education
KP
ih
ih
ih  . 
 
 Note that when K = 0 the dispersion of educational progress in the two 
households described above would be identical for scale independent measures such as 
Theil, Gini, and Coefficient of Variation.  However, when K = 1, inequality would be 
greater in the second household and if 0 < K < 1 inequality is lower in the second 
household. 
 For the measure where K = 1 perfect delay (zero progress) implies Pih = 1, some 
delay implies 1 < Pih < 2, and adequate or fast progression implies Pih > 2.  In this paper, 
we present results for the case where K = 1.  It is critical to note the following points in 
this regard.  First, the scale dependence introduced by this functional form works against 
our principle empirical result – and therefore strengthens it.  That is, we find greater 
dispersion in the poorest households – where the education levels are the lower whereas 
our measure dampens dispersion in households with proportionally lower education 
levels.  Second, we have also estimated regressions for the cases of K = 0 and K = 5 and 
the results are similar (indeed, as expected, the correlation between intra-household 
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dispersion and income is stronger with the scale- independent measure K = 0).  Finally, 
given our context of intra-household dispersion of education attainment we believe that 
we should distinguish between the households such as the two described above, and that 
it is most natural to adopt a measure that maps to greater dispersion for household two.   
 
III.  Data Description and Empirical Methodology   
Overview 
 Our use of the intra-household dispersion of education delay as a proxy for the 
final intra-household education dispersion requires an environment where the rate of 
progress through the education system in highly sensitive to academic performance.  In 
the U.S., for example, where grade repetition is less common, this proxy may have less 
power than in an environment where repetition is widespread.6  In this section we will 
present evidence that Brazil constitutes a near ideal environment for application of our 
technique.  As we will demonstrate, delay due to repetition in Brazil is pervasive.  
 
Data Description – The Brazilian PNAD 
The data used in this study come from the 2001 Brazilian Household Surveys, 
called Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicílio (PNAD), which are administered 
by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the Brazilian Census Bureau. 
The PNAD is an annual labor force survey (similar to the Current Population Survey in 
the United States) that covers all urban areas and the majority of the rural areas in Brazil.7  
The sample is based on a three-stage sampling design. With the exception of the first 
                                                 
6 In the US alternative measures of school performance, such as GPA, could be employed. 
7 The principal excluded area is the rural Amazon. 
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stage, the sampling scheme is self-weighted, and the sampling varies across regions and 
over time. Each PNAD surveys approximately 85,000 households. 
 
Sources of Delay in the PNAD Data 
 Brazilian law requires that children attend school from age seven to fourteen.  If a 
child progresses without delay, they will have completed the upper primary education by 
the age of 15.    Given these specific institutional features our measure of school progress 
is Pih = 1 +  6-ih
ih
age
education
 .8  Figure 1 below shows the percentage of children in our 
sample attending school by age levels, and the percentage of all children experiencing 
some delay according to our measure.9 As Figure 1 illustrates, more than 95% of seven 
year-old children attend school and over 90% are still attending at age 13.  Though 
withdrawal accelerates after age 13, the decline is modest for a low-income country with 
85% still attending at age 16.  On the other hand, around 30% of eight-year-old children 
have experienced some delay and this percentage increases monotonically -- reaching 
nearly 80% for 16 year-old children.  The implication for our analysis is that repetition is 
pervasive in Brazil while withdrawal and late matriculation are only relative small 
contributors to our measure of delay. 10    
                                                 
8 For children not attending school we assign the highest completed years of schooling.  For children attending school 
we assign the corresponding years of schooling for the grade the child is currently attending.  
9 We define a child is delayed if P < 2. 
10 Late matriculation and early withdrawal was common in Brazil until the school expansion of the mid 1900’s allowed 
near universal access to school.  We also verify that throughout our cohort, whose oldest children first matriculated in 
1992, school attendance among the seven year-old children has been at least 90%.  Menezes-Filho (2003) provide 
additional evidence that by the beginning of the 1990’s the vast majority of  the Brazilian young children were 
attending school. 
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 Evidence that grade repetition, rather than late matriculation and withdrawal, is 
pervasive in Brazil can also be found independently of our data.  For example, Fletcher 
and Ribeiro (1988) find a first grade repetition rate of 54% and a 27% repetition rate 
among third graders.  The same authors estimate a repetition rate of 20% and a drop out 
rate of 18% among fourth graders.  This pattern is also corroborated by Mello e Souza 
and Silva (1996) who find that the likelihood of withdrawal only increases dramatically 
after the (lower) primary curriculum is complete.  This is consistent with findings that 
child labor in Brazil increases with age and a child not at school is more likely to work in 
the labor market than a child in school (e.g., Kassouf, 2001).  Again, this constitutes 
ancillary evidence that that the withdrawals in our sample are likely to be permanent. 
 Prior literature examining delay in Brazil has found family background and 
school quality to be important correlates.  Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) analyze 
the determinants of grade attainment, literacy, withdrawal, and child labor among 7 to 14 
year-old children in Brazil in 1980.  They found that parents’ education is the most 
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significant factor associated with these outcomes.  Similarly, Mello e Souza and Silva 
(1996) (using the 1982 PNAD special questionnaire) find that children living in poorer 
households are more likely to repeat, increasing the opportunity cost of staying in school 
and leading to an earlier permanent withdrawal.  Barros and Lam (1996), also using the 
1982 PNAD, find a strong correlation between the education of the parents and the 
school attainment of 14 year-old children. They also find some indirect evidences that 
school quality is positively associated with the school attainment among these children.  
Finally, Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994), using a unique data set from Northeastern 
Brazil in 1983 and 1985, examine the determinants of grade repetition.  They found that 
the most important factors determining school repetition in this environment was student 
achievement levels, the availability of grade levels, and school quality.  The availability 
of grade levels is not however a factor causing repetition in our sample as the full upper 
and lower primary curriculum are now near universally available.               
 
Empirical Methodology 
As discussed above, we want to investigate the relationship between household 
income and the dispersion of the children’s school-progress, holding all else equal.  To 
this end define 
 
(2)  ),;( hhhh XYfD e=  
 
where Dh is a measure of school-progression dispersion in household h, Yh is household 
income, Xh is a vector of other observable variables that affect dispersion, and eh 
represents unobservable factors (such as preferences). Our interest is with the sign of 
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hY
f
¶
¶ (.)
. Empirically, we specify f(.) as a linear function of household income (or our 
instruments for household permanent income) and a vector of other observable household 
characteristics. We estimate OLS regressions of the form: 
 
 (3) hhhhh XMEFED edbba ++++= '21  
 
where the instruments of household income are the father’s and mother’s 
education. We construct separate indicator variables for fathers and mothers educational 
attainment (FEh and MEh respectively), which correspond to the following categories: 
illiterate (zero years of schooling); some lower primary or completed primary education 
(one to four years of schooling); some upper primary or completed upper primary 
education (five to eight years of schooling); some high school or completed high school 
education (nine to eleven years of schooling); and some college or completed college 
education (twelve or more years of schooling).  The vector Xh consists of parents’ age, 
the number of sons and daughters by each age level, a indicator variable, a metropolitan 
area indicator, and state indicators. By including the number of sons and daughters for 
each child’s age by gender, we control for the complete demographic structure of the 
household.  The parameters to be estimated are a, b’s, and d. We assume the error term,  
eh, is i.i.d. normally distributed.  We also run regressions with indicators for the decile of 
parents’ income.11  
 
                                                 
11 Results are similar when year of schooling variables or indicator variables for each year of schooling are 
used.  Similarly, indicator variables for income brackets or income values yield similar results..   
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Measures of Progress/Delay and Measures of Dispersion 
As discussed above, our measure of progress of child i in household h is 
6
1
-
+=
ih
ih
ih age
educa
P , where Pih = 1 indicates zero progress, some delay implies 1 < Pih < 2, 
and adequate or fast progress implies Pih  > 2. The mean Pih across households (Ph) is 
1.845 and its maximum is 4 (see Table A.1 in the appendix).  
We utilize four measures of dispersion of Pih within households. The Theil 
Entropy Measure ÷
÷
ø
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ç
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è
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÷÷ø
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ççè
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ih
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=
, and the proportion of children 
with some delay in a household (pdelay) is NP<2/Nh  where Nh  is the number of children 
in household h, and NP<2 is the number of the household’s children with some delay. The 
Theil index ranges from 0 to 16.69 with a 0.518 mean. The Gini coefficient has a mean 
value of 0.0627 with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 0.561.12 The coefficient of 
variation across households runs from 0 to 0.793 with a mean of 0.094. The average 
proportion of delayed children across households is 0.517, its minimum is 0 and 
maximum is 1.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Note that our since our measure of progress has a minimum value of one, the Gini upper bound is less than 1.  This 
rescaling of the Gini does not affect any qualitative results and a similar procedure with K=0, which yields 
conventional Gini range of zero to one and identical qualitative patterns.   
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IV. Empirical results   
Sample Selection 
Our unit of analysis is a household and the sample selection consists of all two-
parent households with at least two children aged seven to sixteen years inclusive.  The 
selection of a sample with two-parent households is acknowledgement that time 
allocation decisions in a single-parent household may be governed by different processes 
than those in two-parent households. Our sample restriction to households’ containing at 
least two children reflects our focus on the intra-household distribution of OHK across 
children.  The children’s age restriction follows from the school entry age of seven in 
Brazil and the fact that, in principle, children are expected to have completed their 
fundamental education by age sixteen. 13    Finally, all observations for which the age 
difference between the head of the household or spouse and the oldest child is 14 years or 
less are excluded.  The final sample consists of 14,315 households and the summary 
statistics are presented in Table A.1 of the appendix.  
Figure 2 below depicts the averages of our four dispersion measures by the 
parents’ income deciles where parents’ income is the sum of the father and mother’s 
incomes.  The graphs illustrate a robust pattern of monotonically decreasing delay 
dispersion as parental income increases.  
                                                 
13 Our results are not sensitive for the choice of upper-bound age. We replicate our estimations using fifteen and 
seventeen years old as alternative upper-bounds and the results are similar. 
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Figure 2: Average Dispersions of Delays by Deciles of 
Parents' Income   
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Figure 3.a. to 3.d. below present the unconditional mean of each of the four 
dispersion measures by the father’s education category. There is clear consistent 
monotonic negative correlation between delay dispersion within households and the 
father’s education level.    
 
 
Figure 3.a.: Average Theil Measure by Father's Education 
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Figure 3.b.:Average Gini Coefficient by Father's Education 
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Figures 4.a. to 4.d. below present the unconditional mean of each of the four 
dispersion measures by the mother’s education categories. Again, there is clear consistent 
monotonic negative correlation between delay dispersion within households and the 
mother’s education level.    
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.c.: Average Coeficient of Variation by  
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Figure 3.d.: Average of Delay Proportion by Father's  
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Figure 4.a.: Average Theil Measure by Mother's  
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Figure 4.b.: Average Gini Coefficient by Mother's  
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Obviously, these are unconditional correlations and there are other factors that are 
correlated with parent’s income or education that affects the delay dispersion. One of 
these factors is surely family composition.  Although our dispersion measures partially 
compensate for the fact that poor households typically have a greater number of children 
than rich families (since they are normalized by the number of children) they do not 
address birth-order, child-spacing, or gender effects.  These can only be addressed 
through control of the complete demographic structure of the household.  This we 
accomplish through variables for the number of all children at each age by gender for 
ages zero to nineteen and above.  Our regressions therefore include forty variables for 
children’s age in each household.  Children who are not included in our measure of delay 
dispersion because they are too young or too old for mandatory matriculation are 
nevertheless included in our demographic control variables since their presence may 
affect the other children’s time allocations. Similarly, adults presented in the households 
are included in the variable nineteen years old and above. 
In addition to household demographic structure the dispersion of delay can also be 
correlated with the different regions. Moreover, since the Brazilian education system is 
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Figure 4.d.: Average of Delay Proportion by  
Mother's Education 
0.000 
0.100 
0.200 
0.300 
0.400 
0.500 
0.600 
0.700 
0.800 
Illiterate Lower 
Primary 
Upper 
Primary 
High 
School 
College 
Mother's Education 
  
21 
decentralized across states, educational policies may vary across states and affect poor 
and rich households differently.  In order to control for these potential biases we include 
indicator variables for the state, metropolitan, and rural-urban locality. 
Table 1 presents regression results for the Gini Coefficient, Theil Measure, 
Coefficient of Variation, and Proportion of Delay measures of delay dispersion, where 
the right-hand side variables are a set of indicators for each deciles of parents’ income 
(the first decile is the omitted category) plus the parents’ ages, family composition, and 
locality variables. The results are clear and robust across all measures: there is a 
monotonic decrease of dispersion as parents’ income increases, holding family 
composition and locality constant. Note that for ease of presentation the (forty) control 
variables for the demographic structure of children are not incorporated in Tables 1-3, but 
are presented in the Appendix.  The omitted categories of the locality controls are urban 
non-metropolitan areas and the state of São Paulo. For each regression we perform an F-
test of the joint equality of all decile indicators and reject the null hypothesis at 1% level.  
The current income of fathers and mothers or their income deciles may not be an 
ideal predictor of the parents’ permanent income due to its short-run variations or 
measurement error.  For these reasons we instrument permanent income with father’s and 
mother’s education variables, a very good predictor of permanent income.   
Table 2 presents the results of the four regressions for the Gini, Theil, Coefficient 
of Variation, and P-Delay measures, respectively. For each regression, the explanatory 
variables are the education category indicators of fathers and mothers, separately.14 
Examining the results reveals a robust pattern of a monotonic decrease of delay 
                                                 
14 The omitted education category is 0 years of schooling, the omitted locality categories are the urban non-metropolitan areas and the 
São Paulo state. 
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dispersion across the education distribution. The F-test for the joint equality of all the 
education category variables are computed for the father and mother separately and 
shown at the bottom of the tables. The null hypothesis of joint equality is rejected for all 
cases. The results for these regressions are very robust: there is a monotonic negative 
correlation between delay dispersion and parents’ education.  Given the mother’s 
(father’s) education (and the other controls), a better educated father (mother) is 
associated with a more equal delay dispersion among sons and daughters of the same 
household. 
Finally, Table 3 presents results when parents’ income decile indicator variables 
and education indicator variables are used along with the other controls.  Again, the 
patterns obtained before remains. That is, controlling for each parent income (and the 
other controls), there is a negative correlation between parent education and delay 
dispersion. This suggests that there is an education effect over and above the income  
effect. Conversely, holding both parents’ education and one parent’s income constant, the 
greater the other parent income is, the more equal the dispersion is.  It suggests that there 
is an income effect over and above the education effect.  
 
V.  Summary and Conclusion  
A significant relationship between the intra-household dispersion of OHK and 
income may reflect a correlation between income and the intra-household distribution of 
innate talent, systematic a-priori propensities to specialize across the income distribution 
(i.e., “cultural” or class preferences regarding child specialization that vary with income), 
or a differential propensity to specialize in response to environmental factors which vary 
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with income.  We are a-priori skeptical of the first and second explanations, and believe 
that the differential patterns of intra-household dispersion we observe across the income 
distribution reflect “rational” responses to environmental constraints.   
The negative relationship between household income and intra-household 
dispersion of observable human capital in our analysis is extremely robust.  It is not 
affected by adopting different measures of dispersion or by varying the sample selection 
criteria.  Though anticipated by recent theoretical work, this regularity has heretofore 
been unexplored empirically.  Beyond establishing the existence of an unexplored pattern 
of intra-household specialization, we believe this empirical regularity has important 
implications for the evolution of income distribution in the dynastic household.    In 
particular, there has been little research that explores inequality in inter-generational 
upward mobility across siblings within the household.  Our results suggest that within 
poor households, upward mobility may be highly unequal across children. Future 
research will explore this issue in-depth.  
Though this paper has established the existence of an empirical regularity between 
the intra-household delay dispersion and household income, the cause of this regularity 
has not been subject to formal testing.  As noted at the outset, differing distributions of 
innate talent within households across the household income distribution could also 
account for the regularity.  From our prospective, however, the natural explanation 
concerns the differing constraint set faced by households across the income distribution.  
Further exploration of the specific causes of greater dispersion in education attainment in 
poor households is also the subject of ongoing research.   
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Table 1:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Income Deciles 
 GINI  THEIL  CV  PDELAY 
Variables Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error 
Decile One Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Decile Two -0.001  0.002  0.008  0.036  -0.002  0.003  0.006  0.012 
Decile Three -0.005 ** 0.002  -0.060  0.037  -0.007 ** 0.003  -0.015  0.012 
Decile Four -0.005 ** 0.002  -0.038  0.037  -0.007 ** 0.003  -0.060 *** 0.012 
Decile Five -0.010 *** 0.002  -0.105 ** 0.037  -0.014 *** 0.003  -0.083 *** 0.012 
Decile Six -0.012 *** 0.002  -0.112 *** 0.037  -0.018 *** 0.003  -0.121 *** 0.012 
Decile 
Seven -0.011 *** 0.002  -0.110 *** 0.038  -0.017 *** 0.004  -0.145 *** 0.012 
Decile Eight -0.015 *** 0.002  -0.134 *** 0.038  -0.022 *** 0.004  -0.218 *** 0.012 
Decile Nine -0.022 *** 0.002  -0.218 *** 0.038  -0.033 *** 0.004  -0.284 *** 0.012 
Decile Ten -0.030 *** 0.002   -0.264 *** 0.039   -0.044 *** 0.004   -0.383 *** 0.013 
F(8, 14235) 26.89 ***   9.22 ***   26.60 ***   198.03 ***  
R-Squared 0.121    0.122    0.140    0.359   
# OBS 14,315       14,315       14,315       14,315     
Note: (i) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.         
(ii) The additional variables include both parents' age, rural area dummy, metropolitan area dummy, and state dummies.     
(iii) The omitted regions are urban non-metropolitan areas and the State of Sao Paulo.         
(iv) The F-test tests the joint equality of the decile dummy coefficients.      
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Table 2:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Education Levels 
 GINI  THEIL  CV  PDELAY 
Variables Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error  Coeff.   
Est. 
Error 
Father's Education                
Illiterate Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Lower Primary -0.005 *** 0.002  -0.079 *** 0.025  -0.008 *** 0.002  -0.050 *** 0.00777 
Upper Primary -0.010 *** 0.002  -0.127 *** 0.029  -0.016 *** 0.003  -0.084 *** 0.00927 
High School -0.013 *** 0.002  -0.130 *** 0.034  -0.018 *** 0.003  -0.158 *** 0.01073 
College -0.018 *** 0.003  -0.191 *** 0.047  -0.026 *** 0.004  -0.181 *** 0.01481 
Mother's Education                
Illiterate Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Lower Primary -0.005 *** 0.002  -0.064 *** 0.026  -0.007 *** 0.002  -0.052 *** 0.00828 
Upper Primary -0.008 *** 0.002  -0.086 *** 0.030  -0.012 *** 0.003  -0.137 *** 0.00945 
High School -0.016 *** 0.002  -0.155 *** 0.034  -0.023 *** 0.003  -0.253 *** 0.01087 
College -0.019 *** 0.003   -0.166 *** 0.048   -0.028 *** 0.004   -0.292 *** 0.01524 
Father: F(3, 14236) 8.91 ***   2.91 **   9.15 ***   54.69 ***  
Mother: F(3, 14236) 16.56 ***   3.92 ***   15.68 ***   182.11 ***  
R-squared 0.123    0.123    0.142    0.393   
# OBS 14,315       14,315       14,315       14,315     
Note: (i) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.         
(ii) The additional variables include both parents' age, rural area dummy, metropolitan area dummy, and state dummies.     
(iii) The omitted regions are urban non-metropolitan areas and the State of Sao Paulo.         
(iv) The first F-test tests the joint equality of the father's education dummy coefficients. 
     The second F-test tests the joint equality of the mother's education dummy coefficients.      
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 Table 3:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Education Levels and Income Deciles 
 GINI  THEIL  CV  PDELAY 
Variables Coeff.   Est. Error  Coeff.   Est. Error  Coeff.   Est. Error  Coeff.   Est. Error 
Father's Education                
Illiterate Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Lower Primary -0.005 *** 0.002  -0.071 *** 0.025  -0.007 *** 0.002  -0.043 *** 0.008 
Upper Primary -0.009 *** 0.002  -0.109 *** 0.030  -0.013 *** 0.003  -0.069 *** 0.009 
High School -0.008 *** 0.002  -0.090 ** 0.035  -0.012 *** 0.003  -0.126 *** 0.011 
College -0.011 *** 0.003  -0.129 *** 0.050  -0.016 *** 0.005  -0.142 *** 0.016 
Mother's Education                
Illiterate Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Lower Primary -0.004 ** 0.002  -0.060 ** 0.026  -0.007 *** 0.002  -0.049 *** 0.008 
Upper Primary -0.007 *** 0.002  -0.071 ** 0.030  -0.010 *** 0.003  -0.124 *** 0.009 
High School -0.012 *** 0.002  -0.118 *** 0.035  -0.018 *** 0.003  -0.224 *** 0.011 
College -0.013 *** 0.003  -0.106 ** 0.051  -0.019 *** 0.005  -0.255 *** 0.016 
Income Deciles                
Decile One Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category  Omitted Category 
Decile Two -0.001  0.002  0.007  0.036  -0.002  0.003  0.003  0.011 
Decile Three -0.005 * 0.002  -0.058  0.037  -0.007 ** 0.003  -0.014  0.012 
Decile Four -0.004  0.002  -0.022  0.037  -0.005  0.003  -0.042 *** 0.012 
Decile Five -0.008 *** 0.002  -0.083 ** 0.037  -0.012 *** 0.003  -0.054 *** 0.012 
Decile Six -0.009 *** 0.002  -0.082 ** 0.038  -0.013 *** 0.003  -0.075 *** 0.012 
Decile Seven -0.007 *** 0.002  -0.071 * 0.039  -0.011 *** 0.004  -0.079 *** 0.012 
Decile Eight -0.010 *** 0.003  -0.082 ** 0.039  -0.014 *** 0.004  -0.121 *** 0.012 
Decile Nine -0.015 *** 0.003  -0.152 *** 0.041  -0.022 *** 0.004  -0.146 *** 0.013 
Decile Ten -0.019 *** 0.003   -0.171 *** 0.047   -0.028 *** 0.004   -0.167 *** 0.015 
Father: F(3, 14227) 2.96 **   1.15    3.18 **   29.40 ***  
Mother: F(3, 14227) 6.75 ***   1.36    6.24 ***   132.07 ***  
Deciles: (8, 14227) 6.26 ***   2.84 ***   6.23 ***   27.64 ***  
R-squared 0.126    0.124    0.145    0.400   
# OBS 14,315       14,315       14,315       14,315     
Note: (i) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.         
(ii) The additional variables include both parents' age, rural area dummy, metropolitan area dummy, and state dummies.     
(iii) The omitted regions are urban non-metropolitan areas and the State of Sao Paulo.         
(iv) The first F-test tests the joint equality of the father's education dummy coefficients. The second F-test tests the joint equality of the mother's education dummy coefficients.  The third F-test tests 
the joint equality of the decile dummy coefficients.   
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Table A.1: Unweighted Sample Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Age-Grade Distortion Measures      
Average of Age-Grade Distortion 14,315 1.845 0.252 1.000 4.000 
Gini Coefficient of Age-Grade Distortion 14,315 0.063 0.065 0.000 0.561 
Theil Index of Age Grade-Distortion 14,315 0.518 1.028 0.000 16.686 
Coefficient of Variation of Age-Grade Distortion 14,315 0.094 0.096 0.000 0.793 
Proportional Delay 14,315 0.518 0.390 0.000 1.000 
Father's Characteristics       
Age 14,315 41.811 8.098 23.000 98.000 
Income 14,315 669.672 1299.960 0.000 50000.000 
Education Category      
Illiterate 14,315 0.189 0.391 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed Lower Primary 14,315 0.360 0.480 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed Upper Primary 14,315 0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed High School 14,315 0.152 0.359 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed College 14,315 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000 
Mother's Characteristics      
Age 14,315 37.574 6.442 23.000 81.000 
Income 14,315 206.466 644.977 0.000 40000.000 
Education Category      
Illiterate 14,315 0.154 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed Lower Primary 14,315 0.359 0.480 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed Upper Primary 14,315 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000 
Some or Completed High School 14,315 0.165 0.371 0.000 1.000 
Some  or Completed College 14,315 0.062 0.242 0.000 1.000 
Income Deciles      
Decile One 14,315 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Decile Two 14,315 0.108 0.311 0.000 1.000 
Decile Three 14,315 0.090 0.286 0.000 1.000 
Decile Four 14,315 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 
Decile Five 14,315 0.103 0.304 0.000 1.000 
Decile Six 14,315 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Decile Seven 14,315 0.099 0.298 0.000 1.000 
Decile Eight 14,315 0.101 0.301 0.000 1.000 
Decile Nine 14,315 0.101 0.301 0.000 1.000 
Decile Ten 14,315 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Number of Male Persons by Age      
Zero Years Old 14,315 0.015 0.121 0.000 1.000 
One Year Old 14,315 0.020 0.141 0.000 2.000 
Two Years Old 14,315 0.024 0.155 0.000 2.000 
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Three Years Old 14,315 0.031 0.175 0.000 2.000 
Four Years Old 14,315 0.036 0.189 0.000 2.000 
Five Years Old 14,315 0.044 0.206 0.000 2.000 
Six Years Old 14,315 0.048 0.215 0.000 2.000 
Seven Years Old 14,315 0.108 0.315 0.000 2.000 
Eight Years Old 14,315 0.113 0.321 0.000 2.000 
Nine Years Old 14,315 0.115 0.323 0.000 2.000 
Ten Years Old 14,315 0.131 0.341 0.000 2.000 
Eleven Years Old 14,315 0.128 0.339 0.000 2.000 
Twelve Years Old 14,315 0.134 0.344 0.000 2.000 
Thirteen Years Old 14,315 0.140 0.353 0.000 2.000 
Fourteen Years Old 14,315 0.136 0.348 0.000 2.000 
Fifteen Years Old 14,315 0.122 0.331 0.000 2.000 
Sixteen Years Old 14,315 0.118 0.327 0.000 2.000 
Seventeen Years Old 14,315 0.053 0.225 0.000 2.000 
Eighteen Years Old 14,315 0.051 0.221 0.000 2.000 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 14,315 0.144 0.457 0.000 5.000 
Number of Female Persons by Age      
Zero Years Old 14,315 0.018 0.133 0.000 2.000 
One Year Old 14,315 0.020 0.142 0.000 2.000 
Two Years Old 14,315 0.024 0.156 0.000 2.000 
Three Years Old 14,315 0.031 0.175 0.000 2.000 
Four Years Old 14,315 0.034 0.183 0.000 2.000 
Five Years Old 14,315 0.042 0.204 0.000 2.000 
Six Years Old 14,315 0.043 0.205 0.000 2.000 
Seven Years Old 14,315 0.104 0.311 0.000 2.000 
Eight Years Old 14,315 0.117 0.325 0.000 2.000 
Nine Years Old 14,315 0.114 0.323 0.000 2.000 
Ten Years Old 14,315 0.129 0.338 0.000 2.000 
Eleven Years Old 14,315 0.132 0.343 0.000 2.000 
Twelve Years Old 14,315 0.134 0.347 0.000 2.000 
Thirteen Years Old 14,315 0.131 0.343 0.000 2.000 
Fourteen Years Old 14,315 0.126 0.336 0.000 2.000 
Fifteen Years Old 14,315 0.115 0.323 0.000 2.000 
Sixteen Years Old 14,315 0.103 0.309 0.000 2.000 
Seventeen Years Old 14,315 0.041 0.200 0.000 2.000 
Eighteen Years Old 14,315 0.038 0.193 0.000 2.000 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 14,315 0.094 0.354 0.000 5.000 
Locality Contr ols      
Rural Area 14,315 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 
Metropolitan Area 14,315 0.332 0.471 0.000 1.000 
  
32 
Rondónia 14,315 0.014 0.119 0.000 1.000 
Acre 14,315 0.008 0.090 0.000 1.000 
Amazonas 14,315 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 
Roraima 14,315 0.004 0.067 0.000 1.000 
Pará 14,315 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000 
Amapá 14,315 0.003 0.051 0.000 1.000 
Tocantins 14,315 0.020 0.139 0.000 1.000 
Maranhão 14,315 0.025 0.155 0.000 1.000 
Piaui 14,315 0.019 0.135 0.000 1.000 
Ceará 14,315 0.070 0.255 0.000 1.000 
Rio Grande do Norte 14,315 0.016 0.127 0.000 1.000 
Paraiba 14,315 0.024 0.152 0.000 1.000 
Pernambuco 14,315 0.066 0.248 0.000 1.000 
Alagoas 14,315 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000 
Sergipe 14,315 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000 
Bahia 14,315 0.097 0.296 0.000 1.000 
Minas Gerais  14,315 0.098 0.298 0.000 1.000 
Espirito Santo 14,315 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000 
Rio de Janeiro 14,315 0.053 0.224 0.000 1.000 
São Paulo 14,315 0.109 0.312 0.000 1.000 
Paraná 14,315 0.051 0.221 0.000 1.000 
Santa Catarina 14,315 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 
Rio Grande do Sul 14,315 0.065 0.247 0.000 1.000 
Mato Grosso do Sul 14,315 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000 
Mato Grosso 14,315 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000 
Goiás 14,315 0.045 0.208 0.000 1.000 
Federal District 14,315 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 
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Table A.2:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Income Deciles 
 GINI THEIL CV PDELAY 
Variables Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error 
Intercept 0.040 0.005 -0.133 0.078 0.036 0.007 0.373 0.025 
Father's Age 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mother's Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Income Deciles         
Decile Two -0.001 0.002 0.008 0.036 -0.002 0.003 0.006 0.012 
Decile Three -0.005 0.002 -0.060 0.037 -0.007 0.003 -0.015 0.012 
Decile Four -0.005 0.002 -0.038 0.037 -0.007 0.003 -0.060 0.012 
Decile Five -0.010 0.002 -0.105 0.037 -0.014 0.003 -0.083 0.012 
Decile Six -0.012 0.002 -0.112 0.037 -0.018 0.003 -0.121 0.012 
Decile Seven -0.011 0.002 -0.110 0.038 -0.017 0.004 -0.145 0.012 
Decile Eight -0.015 0.002 -0.134 0.038 -0.022 0.004 -0.218 0.012 
Decile Nine -0.022 0.002 -0.218 0.038 -0.033 0.004 -0.284 0.012 
Decile Ten -0.030 0.002 -0.264 0.039 -0.044 0.004 -0.383 0.013 
Number of Male Persons by Age         
Zero Years Old 0.002 0.004 0.021 0.067 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.022 
One Year Old -0.001 0.004 0.023 0.058 -0.001 0.005 0.023 0.019 
Two Years Old 0.001 0.003 0.034 0.053 0.001 0.005 0.040 0.017 
Three Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.044 0.047 0.010 0.004 0.045 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.051 0.044 0.007 0.004 0.057 0.014 
Five Years Old 0.002 0.003 0.021 0.040 0.004 0.004 0.051 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.009 0.002 0.157 0.038 0.013 0.004 0.064 0.012 
Seven Years Old 0.030 0.002 0.666 0.027 0.055 0.003 -0.147 0.009 
Eight Years Old 0.014 0.002 0.238 0.027 0.029 0.003 -0.042 0.009 
Nine Years Old 0.001 0.002 0.075 0.027 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.009 
Ten Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.059 0.025 0.009 0.002 0.037 0.008 
Eleven Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.084 0.025 0.007 0.002 0.056 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.095 0.025 0.008 0.002 0.105 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.003 0.002 0.056 0.025 0.005 0.002 0.126 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old 0.001 0.002 0.136 0.025 0.010 0.002 0.143 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.093 0.026 0.009 0.002 0.153 0.009 
Sixteen Years Old 0.004 0.002 0.144 0.027 0.014 0.002 0.172 0.009 
Seventeen Years Old 0.005 0.002 0.038 0.036 0.007 0.003 0.040 0.012 
Eighteen Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.037 -0.001 0.003 0.051 0.012 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.020 0.003 0.002 0.048 0.006 
Number of Female Persons by Age         
Zero Years Old 0.004 0.004 0.051 0.061 0.005 0.006 0.042 0.020 
One Year Old 0.004 0.004 0.060 0.058 0.006 0.005 0.049 0.019 
Two Years Old -0.001 0.003 -0.061 0.053 -0.002 0.005 0.021 0.017 
Three Ye ars Old 0.001 0.003 0.026 0.047 0.002 0.004 0.018 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.089 0.045 0.009 0.004 0.050 0.015 
Five Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.139 0.041 0.008 0.004 0.043 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.008 0.003 0.147 0.040 0.012 0.004 0.028 0.013 
Seven Ye ars Old 0.038 0.002 0.833 0.028 0.067 0.003 -0.161 0.009 
Eight Years Old 0.014 0.002 0.234 0.027 0.029 0.002 -0.055 0.009 
Nine Years Old 0.005 0.002 0.148 0.027 0.016 0.003 -0.020 0.009 
Ten Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.083 0.026 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.008
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Eleven Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.072 0.025 0.006 0.002 0.038 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.005 0.002 0.042 0.025 0.003 0.002 0.062 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.005 0.002 0.043 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.073 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old -0.007 0.002 0.037 0.026 -0.001 0.002 0.085 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old -0.005 0.002 0.059 0.027 0.002 0.003 0.105 0.009 
Sixteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.102 0.028 0.008 0.003 0.114 0.009 
Seventeen Years Old -0.002 0.003 -0.051 0.041 -0.004 0.004 0.032 0.013 
Eighteen Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.052 0.043 0.009 0.004 0.041 0.014 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.000 0.002 -0.017 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.023 0.008 
Locality Controls         
Rural Area 0.003 0.001 0.018 0.023 0.005 0.002 0.061 0.008 
Metropolitan Area 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.007 
Rondónia 0.014 0.005 0.200 0.073 0.021 0.007 0.127 0.024 
Acre 0.026 0.006 0.320 0.093 0.037 0.009 0.119 0.030 
Amazonas 0.022 0.004 0.226 0.061 0.031 0.006 0.169 0.020 
Roraima 0.010 0.008 0.080 0.124 0.015 0.011 0.089 0.040 
Pará 0.014 0.003 0.100 0.044 0.021 0.004 0.190 0.014 
Amapá 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.160 0.007 0.015 0.073 0.052 
Tocantins 0.012 0.004 0.112 0.064 0.018 0.006 0.137 0.021 
Maranhão 0.018 0.004 0.173 0.059 0.025 0.005 0.166 0.019 
Piaui 0.018 0.004 0.219 0.066 0.028 0.006 0.205 0.021 
Ceará 0.014 0.003 0.131 0.040 0.020 0.004 0.086 0.013 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.023 0.004 0.244 0.069 0.032 0.006 0.104 0.022 
Paraiba 0.023 0.004 0.231 0.059 0.032 0.006 0.150 0.019 
Pernambuco 0.020 0.003 0.223 0.041 0.030 0.004 0.123 0.013 
Alagoas 0.024 0.004 0.253 0.066 0.035 0.006 0.180 0.021 
Sergipe 0.026 0.004 0.330 0.068 0.039 0.006 0.233 0.022 
Bahia 0.021 0.002 0.210 0.037 0.031 0.003 0.168 0.012 
Minas Gerais  0.006 0.002 0.060 0.036 0.009 0.003 0.048 0.012 
Espirito Santo 0.010 0.004 0.141 0.067 0.015 0.006 -0.016 0.022 
Rio de Janeiro 0.017 0.003 0.178 0.043 0.025 0.004 0.177 0.014 
Paraná 0.011 0.003 0.121 0.043 0.017 0.004 -0.017 0.014 
Santa Catarina 0.007 0.004 0.033 0.058 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.019 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.011 0.003 0.123 0.040 0.017 0.004 0.030 0.013 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.020 0.004 0.236 0.065 0.030 0.006 0.016 0.021 
Mato Grosso 0.024 0.004 0.301 0.060 0.034 0.006 0.068 0.020 
Goiás 0.011 0.003 0.091 0.046 0.016 0.004 0.105 0.015 
Federal District 0.008 0.004 0.036 0.059 0.012 0.005 0.076 0.019 
R-Squared 0.121  0.122  0.140  0.359  
Number of Observations 14,315   14,315   14,315   14,315   
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Table A.3:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Education Levels 
 GINI THEIL CV PDELAY 
Variables Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error 
Intercept 0.050 0.005 0.004 0.083 0.051 0.008 0.507 0.026 
Father's Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Mother's Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Father's Educational Controls         
Primary Education -0.005 0.002 -0.079 0.025 -0.008 0.002 -0.054 0.008 
Secondary Education -0.010 0.002 -0.127 0.029 -0.016 0.003 -0.091 0.009 
High School -0.013 0.002 -0.130 0.034 -0.018 0.003 -0.172 0.011 
College/University -0.018 0.003 -0.191 0.047 -0.026 0.004 -0.206 0.015 
Mother's Educational Controls         
Primary Education -0.005 0.002 -0.064 0.026 -0.007 0.002 -0.053 0.008 
Secondary Education -0.008 0.002 -0.086 0.030 -0.012 0.003 -0.142 0.009 
High School -0.016 0.002 -0.155 0.034 -0.023 0.003 -0.265 0.011 
College/University -0.019 0.003 -0.166 0.048 -0.028 0.004 -0.315 0.015 
Number of Male Persons by Age         
Zero Years Old 0.002 0.004 0.016 0.067 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.021 
One Year Old -0.001 0.004 0.017 0.058 -0.002 0.005 0.019 0.018 
Two Years Old 0.001 0.003 0.039 0.053 0.002 0.005 0.048 0.017 
Three Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.042 0.047 0.009 0.004 0.037 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.004 0.003 0.046 0.044 0.007 0.004 0.045 0.014 
Five Years Old 0.002 0.003 0.017 0.040 0.003 0.004 0.042 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.008 0.002 0.152 0.038 0.012 0.004 0.052 0.012 
Seven Years Old 0.030 0.002 0.662 0.027 0.055 0.003 -0.156 0.009 
Eight Years Old 0.014 0.002 0.234 0.027 0.029 0.003 -0.049 0.009 
Nine Years Old 0.001 0.002 0.072 0.027 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.009 
Ten Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.056 0.025 0.008 0.002 0.032 0.008 
Eleven Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.079 0.025 0.007 0.002 0.048 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.091 0.025 0.007 0.002 0.098 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.003 0.002 0.051 0.025 0.004 0.002 0.115 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.132 0.025 0.010 0.002 0.135 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.086 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.140 0.008 
Sixteen Years Old 0.003 0.002 0.137 0.027 0.013 0.002 0.155 0.008 
Seventeen Years Old 0.005 0.002 0.034 0.036 0.006 0.003 0.028 0.012 
Eighteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.037 -0.002 0.003 0.034 0.012 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.034 0.006 
Number of Female Persons by Age         
Zero Years Old 0.004 0.004 0.052 0.061 0.005 0.006 0.040 0.019 
One Year Old 0.004 0.004 0.060 0.057 0.006 0.005 0.050 0.018 
Two Years Old -0.001 0.003 -0.057 0.053 -0.002 0.005 0.025 0.017 
Three Years Old 0.001 0.003 0.030 0.047 0.002 0.004 0.022 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.086 0.045 0.009 0.004 0.039 0.014 
Five Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.136 0.041 0.007 0.004 0.030 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.008 0.003 0.148 0.040 0.012 0.004 0.025 0.013 
Seven Years Old 0.038 0.002 0.830 0.028 0.066 0.003 -0.168 0.009 
Eight Ye ars Old 0.013 0.002 0.230 0.027 0.028 0.002 -0.062 0.009 
Nine Years Old 0.005 0.002 0.145 0.027 0.016 0.003 -0.027 0.009 
Ten Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.080 0.026 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.008 
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Eleven Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.067 0.025 0.006 0.002 0.029 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.005 0.002 0.038 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.053 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.006 0.002 0.039 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.062 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old -0.007 0.002 0.032 0.026 -0.002 0.002 0.075 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old -0.006 0.002 0.053 0.027 0.001 0.003 0.091 0.009 
Sixteen Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.094 0.028 0.007 0.003 0.098 0.009 
Seventeen Years Old -0.003 0.003 -0.058 0.041 -0.005 0.004 0.017 0.013 
Eighteen Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.044 0.043 0.007 0.004 0.023 0.013 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.000 0.002 -0.021 0.025 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.008 
Locality Controls         
Rural Area 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.037 0.007 
Metropolitan Area 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.022 0.007 
Rondónia 0.014 0.005 0.198 0.073 0.021 0.007 0.132 0.023 
Acre 0.026 0.006 0.309 0.093 0.037 0.009 0.125 0.029 
Amazonas 0.025 0.004 0.253 0.061 0.036 0.006 0.228 0.019 
Roraima 0.009 0.008 0.066 0.124 0.013 0.011 0.082 0.039 
Pará 0.017 0.003 0.122 0.044 0.025 0.004 0.237 0.014 
Amapá 0.008 0.010 0.034 0.159 0.011 0.015 0.125 0.050 
Tocantins 0.015 0.004 0.138 0.064 0.022 0.006 0.186 0.020 
Maranhão 0.021 0.004 0.199 0.058 0.030 0.005 0.220 0.018 
Piaui 0.021 0.004 0.240 0.065 0.032 0.006 0.251 0.021 
Ceará 0.017 0.003 0.152 0.040 0.024 0.004 0.130 0.013 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.027 0.004 0.276 0.069 0.038 0.006 0.164 0.022 
Paraiba 0.026 0.004 0.254 0.059 0.037 0.005 0.199 0.019 
Pernambuco 0.024 0.003 0.254 0.041 0.036 0.004 0.179 0.013 
Alagoas 0.027 0.004 0.267 0.066 0.038 0.006 0.217 0.021 
Sergipe 0.029 0.004 0.348 0.067 0.042 0.006 0.272 0.021 
Bahia 0.024 0.002 0.227 0.037 0.034 0.003 0.208 0.012 
Minas Gerais  0.008 0.002 0.076 0.036 0.011 0.003 0.070 0.011 
Espirito Santo 0.013 0.004 0.172 0.067 0.019 0.006 0.033 0.021 
Rio de Janeiro 0.019 0.003 0.195 0.043 0.028 0.004 0.209 0.014 
Paraná 0.012 0.003 0.126 0.043 0.018 0.004 -0.009 0.014 
Santa Catarina 0.007 0.004 0.038 0.058 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.018 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.012 0.003 0.134 0.040 0.018 0.004 0.045 0.013 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.022 0.004 0.255 0.065 0.033 0.006 0.050 0.021 
Mato Grosso 0.025 0.004 0.309 0.060 0.035 0.006 0.079 0.019 
Goiás 0.012 0.003 0.104 0.046 0.018 0.004 0.132 0.015 
Federal District 0.009 0.004 0.040 0.059 0.013 0.005 0.097 0.019 
R-Squared 0.123  0.123  0.142  0.390  
Number of Observations 14,315   14,315   14,315   14,315   
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Table A.4:  OLS Regressions of Delay Dispersion Measures on Parents' Education Levels and Income Deciles 
 GINI THEIL CV PDELAY 
Variables Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error Coeff. Est. Error 
Intercept 0.056 0.006 0.057 0.087 0.059 0.008 0.560 0.027 
Father's Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Mother's Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Father's Educational Controls         
Primary Education -0.005 0.002 -0.071 0.025 -0.007 0.002 -0.043 0.008 
Secondary Education -0.009 0.002 -0.109 0.030 -0.013 0.003 -0.069 0.009 
High School -0.008 0.002 -0.090 0.035 -0.012 0.003 -0.126 0.011 
College/University -0.011 0.003 -0.129 0.050 -0.016 0.005 -0.142 0.016 
Mother's Educational Controls         
Primary Education -0.004 0.002 -0.060 0.026 -0.007 0.002 -0.049 0.008 
Secondary Education -0.007 0.002 -0.071 0.030 -0.010 0.003 -0.124 0.009 
High School -0.012 0.002 -0.118 0.035 -0.018 0.003 -0.224 0.011 
College/University -0.013 0.003 -0.106 0.051 -0.019 0.005 -0.255 0.016 
Income Deciles         
Decile Two -0.001 0.002 0.007 0.036 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.011 
Decile Three -0.005 0.002 -0.058 0.037 -0.007 0.003 -0.014 0.012 
Decile Four -0.004 0.002 -0.022 0.037 -0.005 0.003 -0.042 0.012 
Decile Five -0.008 0.002 -0.083 0.037 -0.012 0.003 -0.054 0.012 
Decile Six -0.009 0.002 -0.082 0.038 -0.013 0.003 -0.075 0.012 
Decile Seven -0.007 0.002 -0.071 0.039 -0.011 0.004 -0.079 0.012 
Decile Eight -0.010 0.003 -0.082 0.039 -0.014 0.004 -0.121 0.012 
Decile Nine -0.015 0.003 -0.152 0.041 -0.022 0.004 -0.146 0.013 
Decile Ten -0.019 0.003 -0.171 0.047 -0.028 0.004 -0.167 0.015 
Number of Male Persons by Age          
Zero Years Old 0.002 0.004 0.013 0.067 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.021 
One Year Old -0.001 0.004 0.018 0.058 -0.002 0.005 0.018 0.018 
Two Years Old 0.001 0.003 0.033 0.053 0.001 0.005 0.041 0.017 
Three Years Old 0.006 0.003 0.038 0.047 0.009 0.004 0.034 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.004 0.003 0.042 0.043 0.006 0.004 0.042 0.014 
Five Years Old 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.040 0.002 0.004 0.036 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.008 0.002 0.148 0.038 0.011 0.004 0.049 0.012 
Seven Years Old 0.029 0.002 0.658 0.027 0.054 0.003 -0.160 0.009 
Eight Years Old 0.013 0.002 0.231 0.027 0.028 0.003 -0.052 0.009 
Nine Years Old 0.001 0.002 0.067 0.027 0.010 0.003 -0.005 0.008 
Ten Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.053 0.025 0.008 0.002 0.028 0.008 
Eleven Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.078 0.025 0.006 0.002 0.046 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.002 0.002 0.089 0.025 0.007 0.002 0.096 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.004 0.002 0.049 0.025 0.004 0.002 0.113 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old 0.000 0.002 0.131 0.025 0.010 0.002 0.133 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.086 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.140 0.008 
Sixteen Years Old 0.003 0.002 0.138 0.027 0.013 0.002 0.156 0.008 
Seventeen Years Old 0.004 0.002 0.032 0.036 0.006 0.003 0.028 0.011 
Eighteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.037 -0.002 0.003 0.034 0.012 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.033 0.006 
Number of Female Persons by Age         
Zero Years Old 0.003 0.004 0.046 0.061 0.004 0.006 0.034 0.019 
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One Year Old 0.003 0.004 0.055 0.058 0.005 0.005 0.042 0.018 
Two Years Old -0.001 0.003 -0.065 0.053 -0.003 0.005 0.016 0.017 
Three Years Old 0.001 0.003 0.024 0.047 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.015 
Four Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.083 0.045 0.008 0.004 0.037 0.014 
Five Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.131 0.041 0.007 0.004 0.027 0.013 
Six Years Old 0.008 0.003 0.142 0.040 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.013 
Seven Years Old 0.037 0.002 0.826 0.028 0.066 0.003 -0.173 0.009 
Eight Years Old 0.013 0.002 0.227 0.027 0.028 0.002 -0.066 0.008 
Nine Years Old 0.004 0.002 0.141 0.027 0.015 0.003 -0.031 0.008 
Ten Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.077 0.026 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.008 
Eleven Years Old -0.003 0.002 0.064 0.025 0.005 0.002 0.026 0.008 
Twelve Years Old -0.005 0.002 0.036 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.051 0.008 
Thirteen Years Old -0.006 0.002 0.038 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.061 0.008 
Fourteen Years Old -0.008 0.002 0.031 0.026 -0.002 0.002 0.074 0.008 
Fifteen Years Old -0.006 0.002 0.052 0.027 0.001 0.002 0.092 0.008 
Sixteen Years Old -0.001 0.002 0.095 0.028 0.007 0.003 0.100 0.009 
Seventeen Years Old -0.003 0.003 -0.056 0.041 -0.005 0.004 0.020 0.013 
Eighteen Years Old 0.005 0.003 0.046 0.043 0.008 0.004 0.024 0.013 
Nineteen Years Old and Above 0.000 0.002 -0.021 0.025 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.008 
Locality Controls         
Rural Area 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.007 
Metropolitan Area 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.028 0.007 
Rondónia 0.014 0.005 0.193 0.073 0.021 0.007 0.125 0.023 
Acre 0.025 0.006 0.306 0.093 0.036 0.009 0.116 0.029 
Amazonas 0.023 0.004 0.235 0.061 0.033 0.006 0.207 0.019 
Roraima 0.009 0.008 0.064 0.124 0.013 0.011 0.079 0.039 
Pará 0.015 0.003 0.101 0.045 0.022 0.004 0.213 0.014 
Amapá 0.007 0.010 0.023 0.159 0.010 0.015 0.114 0.050 
Tocantins 0.013 0.004 0.119 0.064 0.019 0.006 0.163 0.020 
Maranhão 0.018 0.004 0.173 0.059 0.026 0.005 0.190 0.018 
Piaui 0.019 0.004 0.215 0.066 0.028 0.006 0.222 0.021 
Ceará 0.014 0.003 0.125 0.041 0.020 0.004 0.096 0.013 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.024 0.004 0.252 0.069 0.034 0.006 0.134 0.022 
Paraiba 0.023 0.004 0.228 0.060 0.033 0.006 0.167 0.019 
Pernambuco 0.021 0.003 0.222 0.041 0.031 0.004 0.142 0.013 
Alagoas 0.024 0.004 0.240 0.066 0.034 0.006 0.188 0.021 
Sergipe 0.026 0.004 0.324 0.068 0.039 0.006 0.246 0.021 
Bahia 0.021 0.002 0.202 0.037 0.031 0.003 0.179 0.012 
Minas Gerais  0.006 0.002 0.064 0.036 0.009 0.003 0.056 0.011 
Espirito Santo 0.011 0.004 0.156 0.067 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.021 
Rio de Janeiro 0.018 0.003 0.185 0.043 0.026 0.004 0.195 0.014 
Paraná 0.011 0.003 0.119 0.043 0.017 0.004 -0.018 0.014 
Santa Catarina 0.007 0.004 0.041 0.058 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.018 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.012 0.003 0.129 0.040 0.017 0.004 0.038 0.013 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.021 0.004 0.243 0.065 0.031 0.006 0.033 0.020 
Mato Grosso 0.024 0.004 0.300 0.060 0.034 0.006 0.069 0.019 
Goiás 0.011 0.003 0.094 0.046 0.016 0.004 0.118 0.015 
Federal District 0.008 0.004 0.034 0.059 0.012 0.005 0.085 0.018 
R-Squared 0.126  0.124  0.145  0.400  
Number of Observations 14,315   14,315   14,315   14,315   
 
